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THE BLACK ATHLETES' EQUAL




In January 1983, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) adopted new academic standards for students participat-
ing in intercollegiate sports in the top competitive division (Divi-
sion I). Effective August 1, 1986, freshman athletes at Division I
institutions are eligible to play only if they have:
1. A high school cumulative grade point average of at least 2.0 on a
4.0 scale;
2. A 2.0 cumulative grade point average in a specified high school
curriculum consisting of eleven academic courses, including at least three
in English, two in Mathematics, two in Social Science, and two in Natu-
ral or Physical Science (including at least one laboratory class if available
at the school);
3. A combined score of at least 700 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) or 15 on the American College Test (ACT).'
Students who have an overall cumulative grade point average of
2.0 or above but who fail to meet the other standards can receive
athletic scholarships but may not play or practice with a team dur-
ing their freshman year. Moreover, such a student uses up one year
of eligibility during that freshman year.'
These new "get tough" standards were adopted at the January
1983 NCAA annual meeting following heated debate.8 The higher
*1 would like to express appreciation to my research assistant, Jim Lammendola, who
contributed substantially to the text and made these footnotes possible.
tB.A., University of Delaware, 1971; J.D., Duke University, 1974; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. 1983-84 Manual of the NCAA, Bylaws 5-1-(G) at 79.
2. Id.
3. Crowl, NCAA Votes Stiffer Academic Requirements for Participants in Intercolle-
giate Sports, CHRON. OF HIGm EDUc., Jan. 19, 1983, p.1, 20, col. 3. Subsequent editions of
the Chronicle of Higher Education continued discussions of the new standards.
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standards proposal was introduced by L. Donald Shields, president
of Southern Methodist University. Some twenty college presidents
or chancellors spoke in favor of adopting the standards. The pro-
ponents pointed out that the existing standards were being abused
by both high schools and colleges. It was contended that high
schools graduated athletes unprepared for college work, while col-
leges restructured their curricula in order to keep athletes eligible.
These abuses had in turn led to an intolerable degree of illiteracy
among college athletes, many of whom never graduated from col-
lege. The backers of the proposal viewed the vote as a referendum
on the integrity of both the NCAA and higher education generally.
The dramatic denouement for the reform advocates occurred when
Joe Paterno, the well-known and generally respected football coach
of Penn State, the reigning national champion, addressed the
meeting to express support for the proposal and to rebut the
charges of its opponents that the standards are racially
discriminatory.'
The new rules were opposed by several black college presi-
dents who contended that the rules are a racially motivated at-
tempt to reduce the number of black athletes competing at the Di-
vision I level. Jesse N. Stone, Jr., president of Southern University,
was particularly incensed at the inclusion of the standardized test
score cutoff, pointing out that the use of such tests has a dispro-
portionately negative impact on black students.5 Edward B. Fort,
chancellor at North Carolina A & T University, charged that the
test does not predict success in college.6 In the end, the measures
were approved by a hand vote of the Division I members.
4. It is fair to say that Paterno's remarks constituted the debate's most theatrical mo-
ment. Paterno's Nittany Lions had just won the National Championship:
It isn't fair for us to take unprepared students into our universities... . This
isn't a race problem. . . . For the past 15 years we have had a race problem, how-
ever. . . . We've told black kids who bounce balls, run around tracks and catch
touchdown passes that that is an end unto itself. We've raped a whole generation
of black students. We can't affort to do it again.
Crowl, supra note 3, at 20, col. 3.
5. Stone later added that "underlying much of this . .. is the desire to reduce the
number of black faces that we see dominating collegiate athletics .... I can say from expe-
rience and substantial authority that this move is racist inspired." Jarrett, Why Blacks
Fought the NCAA, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 16, 1983, § 2, at 7.
6. Crowl, supra note 3.
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Division I consists of 277 institutions. 7 Seventeen of these in-
stitutions are predominantly black. Immediately following the
meeting, black college presidents caucused to consider possible
courses of action. The alternatives discussed included dropping out
of the NCAA, and filing a lawsuit to prevent the rules from going
into effect.' This paper explores one potential cause of action - an
equal protection challenge to the new rules by black athletes.
It should be noted that in the months following the adoption
of the new rules, statistical data emerged outlining the "effects
that may not have been realized before this decision was reached."'
7. Id.
8. Grambling President Joseph B. Johnson pointed out that the rules were adopted
upon the recommendation of an ad hoc committee of presidents of the American Council on
Education (A.C.E.). He accused the A.C.E. committee of a "lack of sensitivity" for failing to
include black presidents on the committee during its deliberative phases. Crowl, supra note
3, at 20, col. 3. (A.C.E. had named Luna I. Mishoe, president of Delaware State College, as
the sole black member of the committee one week before the convention). Farrell, 2 Civil
Rights Leaders Denounce NCAA's New Academic Standards, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 2. Shortly thereafter, in a move "not related" to the standards con-
troversy, President Johnson was elected to serve on the NCAA's twenty-two member execu-
tive committee, which essentially runs the organization between meetings. Johnson did not
officially accept the position. Vance, Testing Service Head Hits NCAA's Academic Rules,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 2, 1983, at 18, col. 3.
9. Vance, supra note 7, at 1, col. 2. The following statement of Educational Testing
Service president, Gregory R. Anrig, was sent to major news wires and major newspapers
throughout the country.
I have today offered to the American Council on Education and the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) the pro bono assistance of Educational Test-
ing Service to examine the impact of the NCAA decision to include a minimum
test score in its requirement for freshman year athletic eligibility. ETS stands
ready to assist these organizations, in cooperation with the College Board, in con-
sidering ways to achieve fairly and equitably their important goal of strengthened
standards for athletic participation.
The NCAA should be commended for addressing this issue of standards for
athletes. I commend the basic course and minimum grade-point average require-
ments contained in the approved NCAA resolution as being educationally sound
and reasonable for any student aspiring to college, whether athlete or not. The
proposed use of a fixed cutoff score on nationally standardized admissions tests,
however, will have effects that may not have been fully realized before this deci-
sion was reached. Based on 1981 figures for college-bound high school seniors, for
instance, the fixed requirement of a combined SAT score of at least 700 would
have eliminated almost 51 percent of Black males and 60 percent of Black females
from freshman athletic eligibility in this one year alone. While the percentage for
White students are smaller, the total number of White students who would have
been affected in 1981 by the new cutoff rule was 90,527, more than twice the total
number of Black students (42,831) who would have been affected. The issue,
therefore, cuts across racial lines in addition to affecting minorities
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Gregory R. Anrig, the President of Educational Testing Service
(ETS), which develops and administers the SAT, stated opposition
to the use of a fixed cutoff. Anrig revealed that had the regulations
been in effect in 1981, fifty-one percent of all black male freshmen
and sixty percent of all black female freshmen would not have
qualified. Anrig stated that the use of the cutoff affected minorities
"disproportionately." 10 Figures compiled by the Big Eight Confer-
ence indicated that the new rules would have an even greater dis-
proportionate impact on blacks than was revealed by Mr. Anrig."
The Big Eight report indicated that more than sixty percent of
black athletes at member institutions would have been ineligible
under the new rules, with the figure going as high as eighty percent
at some institutions. 2 At the same institutions, the rules would op-
erate to bar only between ten and twenty-seven percent of the
white athletes, according to the Big Eight study.13
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE: MEETING THE STATE
ACTION REQUIREMENT
A. Basis in Constitutional Theory
In American constitutional theory, the distinction between
governmental action and nongovernmental action is crucial. Nearly
all of the constitution's guarantees of individual freedom, including
the right to the enjoyment of the equal protection of the laws, pro-
tect individuals from governmental action. Although the acts of in-
dividuals may infringe upon the rights of other individuals, such
private action does not generally invoke the restraints of the Con-
stitution. Only action of the government is constrained by those
portions of the Constitution which define individual freedom. The
language and structure of the Constitution make this abundantly
clear. Moreover, judicial interpretations of the language and struc-
disproportionately.
I believe the worthy intent of Proposition 48 can be achieved and I want to
offer the full assistance of Educational Testing Service to achieve this goal.
Statement of Gregory R. Anrig, President of Educational Testing Service (Jan. 19, 1983).
10. Vance, supra note 9 at 1, col.2.
11. Vance, Academic Rules Would Affect Blacks Far More Than Whites, Study
Finds, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 16, 1983, at 17, col. 1.
12. Id. at col. 2.
13. Id. at col. 1.
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ture of the Constitution make this point virtually unassailable.
Thus, a person who alleges a denial of constitutionally protected
rights must at the outset demonstrate that it is indeed the action
of the government that is being challenged. In fact, the merits of
the claim will not be reached unless it can be shown that, some-
how, the government has acted. This is the so-called "state action"
requirement.
In some cases, it is very easy to see the governmental action.
For example, a person challenging the constitutionality of a state
statute under the equal protection clause will have little difficulty
meeting the state action requirement. Clearly, the state acts when
it passes a statute. Similarly, in some cases, it will be very easy to
conclude that the state is really not involved in the controversy.
Purely private disputes do not ordinarily raise constitutional issues
no matter how egregious the private act. The difficulty arises in
cases where state action is not apparent but where the state is
nonetheless somehow involved. The boundaries separating the acts
of the government from the acts of the individual are not always so
clear in a society where government plays such a pervasive role.
When the acts of a private entity are the subject of a contro-
versy, the state action inquiry involves a determination as to
"whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the [private] entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'14 The
state must have "significantly involved itself with invidious dis-
criminations" 1 when there has been discrimination by a private
entity for a finding of state action. Additionally, under the public
function doctrine, state action may be found when a private entity
exercises "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.""8
The NCAA is "private" in the sense that it is not a formal creature
of the state. The state, however, is "involved" with NCAA opera-
tions. The question is whether the NCAA action in adopting the
academic standards under attack is "state action" for constitu-
tional purposes. A review of the following case law indicates that
the NCAA's action would be regarded as state action for constitu-
14. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
15. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (quoting Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 366, 380 (1967)).




B. The NCAA-State Action Cases: Buckton and Its Progeny
In Buckton v. NCAA,'7 two Boston University hockey players
sought injunctive relief against the NCAA's declaration of ineligi-
bility. The hockey players, both Canadian citizens residing in Bos-
ton, alleged that the NCAA eligibility rules discriminated against
aliens in a manner prohibited by the equal protection clause. In
addressing the state action issue, the court noted that formally pri-
vate conduct may become "so entwined with governmental policies
or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state ac-
tion.""8 According to the court, in supervising and policing inter-
collegiate athletics, the NCAA "perform[ed] a public function, sov-
ereign in nature"19 that subjected it to constitutional constraints.
The court stated that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance. '20 The court noted that
state universities made up approximately one-half the membership
of the NCAA, that those state institutions paid dues to the NCAA,
and that state facilities were provided for NCAA contests. The
court concluded that the plaintiffs had made the requisite showing
of state action.2
With one exception, every other court to confront the issue
has concluded that the NCAA's acts are to be treated as state acts
for constitutional purposes. The Fifth Circuit in Parish v. NCAA 2 '
affirmed the district court's finding that the NCAA's ineligibility
determination was "under color of state law, '2 pointing out that
17. 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
18. Id. at 1156 (quoting Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
19. Id. at 1156 (quoting Curtis v. NCAA., C-71 2088 ACW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 1972)
(unreported)).
20. Id. at 1156, (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961)).
21. Id. at 1157.
22. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 1032. The "under color of state law" finding is required to bring a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Parish court viewed the under color of state law finding
as equivalent to a finding of state action. In fact, the Parish court used the two terms inter-
changeably. It should be pointed out, however, that a defendant's actions under color of
state law may not necessarily constitute state action. See Gresham Park Community Org. v.
[Vol. 19:83
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the NCAA performed a "traditional governmental function. . . by
taking upon itself the role of coordinator and overseer of college
athletics." '24 As in Buckton, the court also noted the substantial
involvement of state supported institutions in the NCAA's pro-
gram and found that the state participation in and support of the
NCAA was a "well recognized basis for finding state action. ' 25 The
D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case once again in-
volving an athlete seeking injunctive relief from an NCAA determi-
nation of ineligibility in Howard University v. NCAA: 26
If the NCAA was composed of solely public institutions, clearly state
action would be present. In contrast, if the NCAA had no public mem-
bers, its action would be private for constitutional purposes. Drawing the
line as to the requisite quantum of public participation to invoke four-
teenth amendment protections is a difficult task indeed. However, that is
unnecessary in this case where the degree of public participation and en-
tanglement between the entities is substantial and pervasive.""
As support for its conclusion, the court pointed out that public in-
stitutions provide most of the NCAA's capital and that state in-
strumentalities are a "dominant force in determining NCAA policy
and in dictating NCAA actions. "'2 NCAA actions appeared "im-
pregnated with a governmental character. 2 9 The NCAA and its
member public institutions are "joined in a mutually beneficial
... symbiotic relationship"30 sufficient to trigger constitutional
Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238 n.27 (5th Cir. 1981) where the court cited Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) and Adickes S.H. Press & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) as support
for the proposition that state action and under color of state law are not equivalent.
24. 506 F.2d at 1032-33. The court went on to say that it had "little doubt... that
were the NCAA to disappear tomorrow, government would step in to fill the void." Id. at
1033.
25. Id. at 1032.
26. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 220.
28. Id. at 219.
29. Id. at 220 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
30. Id. at 220. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1977) (due process afforded to ineligible student athletes who reasonably understood NCAA
rules); Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977) (Puerto
Rican athletic association rule that denied non-Puerto Rican student athletes who entered
member institutions after their 21st birthday the right to participate in annual competitions
was "under color of" commonwealth law); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251
(9th Cir. 1974) (university and NCAA 1.600 grade point average eligibility rule "state ac-
tion" for constitutional purposes); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo.
1976) (NCAA actions in imposing sanctions on the university for failure to declare several
hockey players ineligible for participation was "under color of state law"); Jones v. NCAA,
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scrutiny.
McDonald v. NCAA 1" stands alone in support of the view that
the NCAA's actions are not state actions for constitutional pur-
poses. Once again, the case arose in the context of a request for
injunctive relief by athletes declared ineligible by the NCAA. The
court observed that "[wjhat must appear is that the state must be
so inextricably involved in the 'private' action or must be able to
so control the 'private' action that this activity necessarily becomes
the functional equivalent of an act of the sovereign."32 According
to the court, the NCAA was an essentially private entity and was
thus unconstrained by the constitutional requirements of due pro-
cess and equal protection. The plaintiffs therefore had "no stand-
ing to claim invasion of any protectable interest under the United
States Constitution as to the NCAA." 3 However, the continued
validity of McDonald is in serious doubt."
Based on the conclusions of the cases confronting the issue, it
appears that a challenge to the new academic standards would pass
the state action obstacle. Assuming this to be the case, the stan-
dards would then be tested on the merits under constitutional
principles. The gist of the constitutional attack upon the standards
is that they deny to blacks the equal protection of the laws. The
section that follows addresses the equal protection issues raised by
the challenge.
392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975) (NCAA action declaring former professional hockey player
ineligible for intercollegiate competition constitutes state action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983);
Samara v. NCAA, 1973 Trade Cases § 74, 536 (E.D. Va.) (plaintiffs declared ineligible to
participate intercollegiately for participating in uncertified track events; "state action" seen
as tenuous but adopted arguendo); Curtis v. NCAA, Case No. C-71 2088 ACW (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 1, 1972).
31. 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
32. Id. at 630. Although McDonald is clearly out of step with the other NCAA state
cases, a good argument can be made that the McDonald approach more accurately reflects
how the Supreme Court might decide the issue. The Supreme Court's recent state action
cases reveal a decidedly narrow state action view. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Blum v. Yaretsky,
102 S.Ct. 2777, - U.S. - (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S.Ct. 2766 (1982).
33. 370 F. Supp. at 632.
34. Associated Students, Inc., Etc., v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974) (following
the majority approach, found state action and thus, while not expressly overruling McDon-




III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE: ATTACKING THE
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
The success of the equal protection challenge will depend
largely upon how the court characterizes the classification scheme
embodied in the new standards. Absent a showing that the stan-
dards are in fact purposefully racial classifications, the court will
likely engage in the rather undemanding "minimum rationality"
review. If, on the other hand, it could be shown that the new stan-
dards should be viewed as purposeful racial classifications, the
court will most likely view them with great suspicion under the
standards of "strict scrutiny." In short, the characterization of the
academic standards as purposefully racial is the key to the equal
protection litigation. 5 A review of the relevant recent Supreme
Court cases provides the guide for resolving the question.
A. Proving Purposeful Racial Discrimination: The Burger
Court's Approach
The Burger Court has struggled with the purposeful racial dis-
crimination requirement in a series of recent cases beginning with
Washington v. Davis" in 1976 and followed by Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.37 in
1977, City of Mobile v. Bolden"' in 1980, and most recently Rogers
v. Lodge"' in 1982.
Washington v. Davis established that purposeful discrimina-
tion was necessary to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.40 The
case involved a facially neutral requirement of a written personnel
test to become a police officer. The test operated to disproportion-
35. Minimum rationality review has been aptly characterized as undemanding in the-
ory and non-existent in fact. Classification schemes reviewed under the minimum rationality
test invariably pass the test. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAI1v. L. REv. 1 (1972). It
should also be pointed out that a new "middle tier" has emerged. Utilized first in gender
discrimination cases, middle tier analysis has recently become more prominent. It is con-
ceivable that the NCAA scheme could be regarded as a benign racial classification subject to
middle tier analysis. Middle tier analysis is not outcome determinative.
36. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
37. 429 U.S. 252 (1977), reh'g denied, 103 S.Ct. 198 (1982).
38. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
39. 102 S.Ct. 3272 (1982).
40. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
1983/84]
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ately exclude blacks. Justice White delivered the opinion of the
Court. He said that a disproportionate impact alone is not enough
to trigger strict scrutiny; it must also be shown that the classifica-
tion scheme is purposefully discriminatory:
[Olur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact .... 41
A purpose to discriminate must be present ... to such an ex-
tent as to show intentional discrimination. 42
White went on to point out that disproportionate impact, however,
is relevant to the issue of discriminatory purpose:
This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose
must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law's
disproportionate impact is irrelevant....
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be in-
ferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is
true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another .... Dis-
proportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination .... 43 Standing alone, it does not trig-
ger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny .... 44
In Davis, the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case; thus,
the burden never shifted to the state to rebut "the presumption of
unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neu-
tral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochro-
matic result."4 5
In Arlington Heights, Justice Powell's majority opinion elabo-
rated on the proper subjects of inquiry in determining whether dis-
criminatory purpose exists.4" The case involved the refusal of a
Chicago suburb to grant a request to rezone for multiple family
development. The effect of the refusal was that low income tenants
were deprived of the chance to live in subsidized housing and that
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id. (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)).
43. Id. at 241-42.
44. Id. at 242 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
45. Id. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
46. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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racial minorities were disproportionately burdened. Powell reiter-
ated that it is the plaintiff's burden to make the threshold showing
"that [a] discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in
the ... decision.47 Once this showing is made, the burden will
shift to the state to establish that "the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been consid-
ered. ' 4s Admittedly, proving that invidious discriminatory purpose
is no easy task:
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action
...provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, un-
explainable on grounds other than race, emerges. . . .The evidentiary
inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern
...the Court must look to other evidence.
49
Powell then articulated the appropriate evidentiary inquiries
to be made in the more common, difficult cases:
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source ...
The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also
may shed some light on the decisionmaker's purposes. . . .Departures
from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that im-
proper purposes are playing a role. Substantive departures too may be
relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the
decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.
The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant, es-
pecially where there are contemporary statements by members of the
decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports. In some ex-
traordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial
to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although even
then such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege."0
After completing this litany, which was not "exhaustive,"
47. Id. at 270.
48. Id. at 271, n.21.
49. Id. at 266.
50. Id. at 267-68. In regard to the testimonial privilege, Powell pointed out in a foot-
note that "judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial
intrusion into the workings of ... government. Placing a decisionmaker on the stand is
therefore "usually to be avoided." Id. at 268 n.18 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). Note, then, the plaintiff's predicament-he must
show 'purpose' but is precluded from making obviously relevant inquiry by a testimonial
privilege. A challenge to such a privilege would itself present an interesting constitutional
case.
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Powell turned to the record in this particular case and found no
demonstration of "racially discriminatory intent. '5 1 The challeng-
ers had "simply failed to carry their burden of proving that dis-
criminatory purpose was a motivating factor." 2
That the Arlington Heights guidelines did not wholly clarify
the purposefulness issue for a wide range of cases is demonstrated
in both Mobile v. Bolden" and Rogers v. Lodge." The Court has
splintered badly on the issue.
Mobile v. Bolden was originally brought as a class action suit
on behalf of all black citizens of Mobile.55 The complaint alleged
that the method of electing city commissioners at-large, adopted
by Mobile in 1911, unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength
of Mobile's blacks, who comprised approximately 35.4% of the
city's population but who had never elected a City Commissioner.
The district court found that the constitutional rights of plaintiffs
had been violated and ordered the establishment of single member
districts. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the discrimination was not "purposeful."'5 I
Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and de-
livered an opinion in which the Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and
Justice Rehnquist joined. The plurality opinion noted that the
plaintiff had the burden of showing that the "disputed plan was
conceived or operated as [a] purposeful [device] to further racial
discrimination''57 and that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their
burden. The lower courts had supported their conclusion that pur-
posefulness had been shown by drawing upon the substantial his-
tory of de jure racial discrimination in the state. Justice Stewart
rejected this approach, saying "past discrimination cannot, in the
manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not
itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether a discrimi-
natory intent has been proven in a given case." 5 And in this case,
51. Id. at 265.
52. Id. at 270.
53. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
54. 102 S.Ct. 3272 (1982).
55. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1980)).
58. Id. at 74.
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it had not been proven.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote separate concurring
opinions. Justice Blackmun thought that the findings of the dis-
trict court supported an inference of purposeful discrimination but
concurred in the court's judgment because he believed the district
court order to establish single member districts was an abuse of
discretion. 9 Justice Stevens took a different tack entirely on the
issue of purposefulness. Although he was persuaded that some sup-
port for the disputed 1911 plan came from members of the white
majority who were "motivated by a desire to make it more difficult
for members of the black minority to serve," 60 he was unwilling to
conclude that that was enough to invalidate the scheme. Justice
Stevens simply does not believe that "otherwise legitimate political
choices can be invalidated simply because an irrational or invidious
purpose played some part in the decision-making process." 1
Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan dissented. White be-
lieved, along with Blackmun, that the lower courts had properly
inferred invidious discriminatory purpose from the totality of
facts. He condemned the plurality's reasoning:
[T]he plurality today rejects the inference of purposeful discrimination
apparently because each of the factors relied upon by the courts below is
alone insufficient to support the inference. .. . By viewing each of the
factors relied upon below in isolation... the plurality rejects the "total-
ity of circumstances" approach we endorsed in ... Arlington Heights.2
Justice Marshall acknowledged that under Davis, a showing of
discriminatory purpose is necessary to impose strict scrutiny on
facially neutral classifications which have a racially discriminatory
impact, so long as the fundamental rights strand of equal protec-
tion analysis is not triggered. s In his discussion of purposefulness,
59. Id. at 80.
60. Id. at 92.
61. Id. at 92. In a scathing dissent, Justice Marshall takes Stevens to task for approv-
ing a scheme in which both discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent are acknowl-
edged. "An approach that accepts intentional discrimination against Negroes ... strikes at
the very hearts of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments." Id. at 139, n.37.
62. Id. at 103.
63. It should be noted Marshall thought that the plaintiffs in this case did not have to
show discriminatory purpose because the fundamental right of voting was infringed. In Mar-
shall's dissenting view, proof of discriminatory purpose was not required to support a claim
of vote dilution. In an extended footnote, he referred to Ely, The Centrality and Limits of
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Marshall quarreled with the plurality:
If it is assumed that proof of discriminatory intent is necessary . . . the
question becomes what evidence will satisfy this requirement.
This Court has acknowledged that the evidentiary inquiry involving
discriminatory intent must necessarily vary depending upon the factual
context. . . . One useful evidentiary tool, long recognized by the common
law, is the presumption that "[e]very man must be taken to contemplate
the probable consequences of the act he does."...
I would apply the common-law foreseeability presumption.. . . [In
this case], [blecause the foreseeable disproportionate impact was so se-
vere, the burden of proof should have shifted to the defendants ... to
show that they refused to modify the districting schemes in spite of, not
because of, their severe discriminatory effect."
Marshall also took the plurality to task for failing to recognize
that the maintenance of the system in the face of the discrimina-
tory consequences suggested that state officials were blinded by
"racially selective sympathy and indifference. ' e5
Like outright racial hostility, selective racial indifference reflects a belief
that the concerns of the minority are not worthy of the same degree of
attention paid to problems perceived by whites. . . . It takes only the
smallest of inferential leaps to conclude that the decisions to maintain
multi-member districting having obvious discriminatory effects re-
Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DMoo L. REv. 1155, 1160-61 (1978), which articulated the dan-
ger of requiring that discriminatory purpose be shown in all cases:
The danger I see is ... that the Court, in its newfound enthusiasm for motivation
analysis, will seek to export it to the fields where it has no business. It therefore
cannot be emphasized too strongly that analysis of motivation is appropriate only
to claims of improper discrimination in the distribution of goods that are constitu-
tionally gratuitous (that is, benefits to which people are not entitled as a matter of
substantive constitutional right). However where what is denied is something to
which the complainant has a substantive constitutional right-either because it
is granted by the terms of the Constitution, or because it is essential to the effec-
tive functioning of a democratic government-the reasons it was denied are irrel-
evant. It may become important in court what justifications counsel for the state
can articulate in support of its denial. or nonprovision, but the reasons that actu-
ally inspired the denial never can: To have a right to something is to have a
claim on it irrespective of why it is denied. It would be a tragedy of the first order
were the Court to expand its burgeoning awareness of the relevance of motivation
into the thoroughly mistaken notion that a denial of a constitutional right does
not count as such unless it was intentional.
446 U.S. at 121 n.21 (1980) (emphasis original).
64. 446 U.S. at 136-37.
65. Id. at 139 (quoting Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In De-
fense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HAsv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1976)).
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present, at the very least, selective racial sympathy and indifference ...
If this Court refuses to honor our long recognized principle that the
Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination, it cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect
political channels of seeking redress."
The most recent chapter in the purposefulness book written
by the court produced some interesting twists and shifts. In Rogers
v. Lodge,6 7 a still sharply divided court elaborated upon the re-
quirements and implications of Mobile, but this time, a majority
affirmed the lower courts' holdings that a sufficient showing of pur-
posefulness had been made. In Rogers, the plaintiffs attacked the
long-standing at-large system for electing county commissioners.68
The district court decided the case prior to the Mobile decision. It
found that the electoral method was being maintained for invidi-
ous purposes and ordered the county divided into districts for pur-
poses of electing county commissioners. The court of appeals
affirmed.
Justice White, a dissenter in Mobile, wrote for the new major-
ity. 9 He reviewed the evidence relied upon by the lower courts and
concluded that "none of the factual findings are clearly errone-
ous."7 0 Relevant facts included a showing of disproportionate im-
pact-no black had ever been elected under the scheme. Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs offered evidence that past discrimination had
had an impact on "the ability of blacks to participate effec-
tively. '71 It was also shown that the elected white officials had
been "unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black corn-
66. Id. at 139, 141 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan dissented with a brief notation:
I dissent because I agree with Mr. Justice Marshall that proof of discriminatory
impact is sufficient [here]. I also dissent because, even accepting the plurality's
premise that discriminatory purpose must be shown, I agree with Mr. Justice
Marshall and Mr. Justice White that the appellees have clearly met that burden.
Id. at 94.
67. 102 S.Ct. 3272 (1982).
68. The factual setting parallels Mobile. Both at-large schemes were adopted in 1911.
In both venues, blacks were never elected under the scheme. Mobile's population was ap-
proximately 35.4% black. Burke County, Georgia (the county challenged in Rogers) had a
slight majority of whites.
69. The new majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor.
70. 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3279 (1982).
71. Id. at 3280.
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munity.' 2 The state had "retained a system which [had] mini-
mized the ability of ... blacks to participate in the political sys-
tem.' 7 3 The proof in the case was sufficient "to support an
inference of intentional discrimination. '74 Justice White con-
cluded, "[allthough a tenable argument can be made to the con-
trary, we are not inclined to disagree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the District Court applied the proper legal
standard. '7 5
Justice Stevens filed a lengthy dissent elaborating upon his
views, which were previously articulated in Mobile. He stated his
concern about the Court's "emphasis on subjective intent as a cri-
terion for constitutional adjudication." '
For in the long run constitutional adjudication that is premised on a
case-by-case appraisal of the subjective intent of local decisionmakers
cannot possibly satisfy the requirement of impartial administration of
the law that is embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. . . . The costs
and the doubts associated with litigating questions of motive, which are
often significant in routine trials, will be especially so in cases involving
the 'motives' of legislative bodies."'
He condemned particularly the majority's unscientific, seat-of-the-
pants motivation analysis:
It is incongruous that subjective intent is identified as the constitu-
tional standard and yet the persons who allegedly harbored an improper
intent are never identified or mentioned. Undoubtedly, the evidence re-
lied upon. . . proves that racial prejudice has played an important role
in the history of Burke County and has motivated many wrongful acts by
various community leaders. But unless that evidence is sufficient to
prove that every governmental action was motivated by a racial animus,
. . . the Court has failed under its own test to demonstrate that the gov-
ernmental structure of Burke County was maintained for a discrimina-
tory purpose.78
72. Id. at 3280.
73. Id. at 3280.
74. Id. at 3279. It is extremely difficult to explain the difference between Rogers and
Mobile. Perhaps it is simply a matter that the plaintiffs in Rogers did a better job of proving
their case. If this is true, plaintiffs in such cases are well-advised to be meticulous in offering
their evidence of purposefulness.
75. Id. at 3278.
76. Id. at 3289.
77. Id. at 3289-90.
78. Id. at 3291.
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And he stated his belief that "the Court errs by holding the struc-
ture of the local governmental unit unconstitutional without iden-
tifying an acceptable, judicially-manageable standard. . ..",9
Justice Powell was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justice
Rehnquist. Powell failed to see the distinction between this case
and Mobile:
The [lower courts] based their findings. . . on the same factors held in-
sufficient in Mobile. . . . [Tihe court's opinion [here] cannot be recon-
ciled persuasively with [Mobile]. There are some variances in the largely
sociological evidence presented in the two cases. But Mobile held that
this kind of evidence was not enough.6 0
He bemoaned the subjective approach of the majority. "Federal
courts thus are invited to engage in deeply subjective inquiries into
the motivations of local officials .... Inquiries of this kind not
only can be "unseemly". . . they intrude the Federal courts-with
only the vaguest constitutional direction-into an area of intensely
local .. .concern."81 Unwilling to go quite as far as Stevens in
rejecting subjective intent entirely, he nonetheless stated his agree-
ment with Stevens that "'objective' factors should be the focus of
inquiry." ' Objective factors were "direct, reliable, and unambigu-
ous indices of discriminatory intent."88 Powell summed up his po-
sition by stating: "[I]n the absence of proof of discrimination by
reliance on. . .objective factors. . .I would hold that the factors
[here] are too attenuated as a matter of law to support an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent."
B. Proving Purposeful Racial Discrimination by the
NCAA: The Black Athletes' Case
To trigger the judicial scrutiny most likely to invalidate the
new standards, the black athlete must offer sufficent proof of "pur-
poseful" discrimination. A successful prima facie case will have to
explore the "totality of relevant facts" related to the NCAA's deci-
79. Id. at 3284.
80. Id. at 3281-82.
81. Id. at 3282 (citing Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 1163, 1164 (1978)).





sion to adopt the new academic standards. What follows is an out-
line of the critical areas to be considered.
1. Disproportionate Impact
Although disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny, it is a useful starting point. It is relevant to
the issue of purposefulness: the fact that the NCAA scheme bears
more heavily on blacks than on whites tends to prove that the pur-
pose of the scheme is invidious. In this regard, the black athletes'
case would include statistical studies showing the disproportionate
impact. Studies by ETS and the Big Eight already noted would be
introduced as evidence. Additional statistical evidence should be
gathered which helps define the extent to which the NCAA rules
disproportionately burden black athletes. There appears to be no
disagreement on the fact of disproportion, but only disagreement
as to the extent of it. Convincing evidence of the disproportionate
impact, though not the sole touchstone of a constitutionally pur-
poseful racial discrimination, is an essential component of the
black athletes' case.
2. Historical Background
The historical background of the decision is obviously one evi-
dentiary source. Both the "track record" of the decisionmaking
body on racial issues and the more immediate sequence of events
leading up to the decision would appear relevant to the issue of
purposefulness. Although it is true that a pattern of past discrimi-
nation will not be equivalent to a showing that the particular deci-
sion under attack is motivated by racial animus, surely such a pat-
tern will be regarded as relevant to the issue of purposefulness. In
this regard, the history of race relations in the NCAA could appro-
priately be reviewed for evidence of racial discrimination. Although
the ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has
been proven in a given case, 85 a showing that past discrimination
has infringed on the ability of black athletes to participate effec-
tively is relevant and admissible." Assuming that some evidence of
past racial discrimination by the NCAA can be shown, the plaintiff
should then focus attention on the more immediate "sequence of
85. See Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
86. See Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. 327 (1982).
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event leading up to the challenged action. '8 7
3. The More Immediate Sequence of Events
"Frequently, the most probative evidence of intent [of pur-
posefulness] will be objective evidence of what actually happended
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor"." In this regard, the black athletes' case should focus upon
the specific process by which the new rules were adopted, with an
eye out for objective manifestations of both "outright racial hostil-
ity" and "racially selective sympathy and indifference."8 9 In other
words, the decision-making process must be gone over with a fine-
toothed comb to isolate both the "sophisticated as well as simple-
minded modes of [racial] discrimination.'1 0
For example, the following facts would be constitutionally rel-
evant to the issues of purposefulness:
(1) Blacks were not represented on the planning commit-
tee which drafted the new standards during its deliberative
phase;"
(2) A black was appointed to the planning committee one
week before the NCAA Convention;9"
(3) The tenor of the debate at the convention revealed
that the decisionmakers were aware of the fact that the new
standards could be viewed as racial classifications;
(4) A black was appointed to the NCAA Executive Com-
mittee shortly after the convention.93
This list is by no means exhaustive. The point is that the
plaintiff must painstakingly review the entire decisionmaking pro-
cess and marshal facts in support of the theory that the line-draw-
ing implicit in the new standards reveals that a discriminatory pur-
87. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1979).
88. 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
89. 446 U.S. 55, 139 (Marshall, J., dissenting in Mobile).
90. 446 U.S. at 141. (Marshall, J., dissenting in Mobile, quoting Lane v. Wilson, 4307
U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
91. Rodgers v. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3280 (1982).
92. Id. The inference to be drawn here is that the appointment was made for cosmetic
reasons to give the appearance of a lack of racial bias.




pose has been a motivating factor in the decision."' It should also
be remembered that it may be appropriate to elicit testimony di-
rectly from the decision-makers.95
4. Maintaining the Plan
It is one thing to show discriminatory purpose through a re-
view of "the specific sequence of events leading up to the deci-
sion"9 and quite another to show discriminatory purpose by proof
that the plan is being "maintained for invidious purposes. ' 97 Rog-
ers v. Lodge is premised on the view that maintenance of a dis-
criminatory scheme, which may have been racially neutral when
adopted, nonetheless might constitute purposefully racial discrimi-
nation.98 In our hypothetical lawsuit, the maintenance argument
would seem to provide the appropriate setting for introducing a
whole new range of evidence. This argument would focus attention
on the less racially burdensome alternatives available. The hypoth-
esis here is that the maintenance of a scheme which disproportion-
ately burdens blacks is invidious if it can be shown that equally
effective, less burdensome alternatives are readily available. By
way of illustration, it might be shown that a rule which prohibits
freshmen from competing at the varsity level, when coupled with
an extensive tutorial program, is a more effective, less burdensome
alternative. Moreover, evidence of the ineffectiveness of the main-
tained plan is relevant to the issue. In this regard, it might be
shown that the 700 SAT score cut-off is arbitrary and is not
equivalent to the 15 ACT cutoff. If this is so, there is an inherent
contradiction in the plan which reduces its effectiveness. In short,
the maintenance argument opens the door wide for evidence of the
effectiveness of the maintained plan and alternatives to the main-
tained plan.
94. Davis, 426 U.S. 55 (1976).
95. At this point it would be appropriate to review Justice Powell's guide. See supra
note 50.
96. 429 U.S. at 267.
97. The trial court in Rogers found that the plan was "racially neutral when adopted,"
[but was] being maintained for invidious purposes." 102 S.Ct at 3275) (emphasis original).




The black athletes' equal protection challenge to the NCAA's
new academic requirements is by no means frivolous. With proper
attention to detail and precedent, the black athletes may in fact
succeed. But success in such a case will not be achieved unless the
decisionmaker is ready and willing to recognize and appreciate the
fact that racism today is generally more subtle than the traditional
kind. The traditional brand of racism was marked by outright ra-
cial hostility. The modern version more often takes the form of
"racially selective sympathy and indifference. '"9 Both reflect "a be-
lief that the concerns of the minority are not worthy of the same
degree of attention paid to problems perceived by whites." 100 The
success of the black athletes' claim will depend largely on the will-
ingness of the court to find that the subtle modern manifestations
of racism are to be treated as the constitutional equivalents of out-
right racial hostility. The question is whether the courts will honor
the long recognized principle that "the Constitution 'nullifies so-
phisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.' "10,
99. 446 U.S. at 139 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 141. Marshall continued by saying that if the court refused to honor the
principle, "it cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political channels of
seeking redress." Id. at 141.
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